IMPROVING MILITARY RESPONSE TO CATASTROPHIC EVENTS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the devastation of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 exposed several areas for improvement in the federal government's ability to respond to catastrophic domestic events. With hard lessons comes change, which can be slow and difficult. Mark Twain said, "Habit is habit, and not to be flung out of the window by any man, but coaxed downstairs a step at a time." 1 Both unfortunate and somewhat understandable, this has been the case within the federal, state and local bureaucracies responsible for improving our Nation's coordinated response to natural and manmade disasters within the United States.
This paper focuses on the military response to catastrophic incidents in the United States and makes recommendations for the next "step", by analyzing some of the current policies, legislation, strategies, procedures, processes and relationships as they affect the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the National Guard (NG). Catastrophic incidents are defined as "any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale and/or government functions." century threats and hazards demand a unified and coordinated national approach to domestic incident management and "a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur." 4 The U.S. military has a long and proud tradition of defending our nation from attack and assisting civil authorities during times of crisis. Our military services must be prepared to respond to a catastrophic incident in the United States, including both natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Interagency coordination and collaboration between DHS, DOD and the National Guard is key to the success of this preparedness.
While there have been considerable improvements in preparedness, several recent studies, reports and professional articles indicate room for significant improvement in interagency planning, collaboration, coordination, and ultimately execution. Specific examples will be discussed later to demonstrate the need for change and support the recommendations of this paper. However, prior to making an argument for recommended changes, it is important to provide perspective and context through a brief history of emergency management in the United States.
History of Emergency Management in the United States
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Our founding fathers established a constitutional framework in which each state ceded some of its powers to the federal government to create one united but limited central government. 6 The Constitution establishes the specific and delegated powers that delineate federal and state roles. 7 Our system provides a structure to enable coordination between federal and state governments to create a balance that recognizes the sovereignty of both entities. and comprehensive approach to national planning. 22 In addition to prevention, the aim of these documents is to minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters and other emergencies that do occur. Currently the potential still exists for a dispute to emerge surrounding state sovereignty and the command and control of forces within its borders, as was the case with Katrina, during the most critical points of a major disaster. In addition to the disruption during a crisis, the lack of pre-determined command and control structure stifles planning, coordination and relationship building at operational and tactical levels prior to crisis. For these reasons, the current parallel command model is not suitable for crisis response.
Recommendation #1 calls for establishing pre-determined C2 authority for DoD response to catastrophic incidents (all-hazards) in order to enhance deliberate planning and efficient execution of emergency response. In addition, the recommendation provides policy guidance for a preferred model and the process for development of the C2 structure.
The following is a discussion on the three most plausible C2 options, concluding with a preferred model. 39 All of the subjoined options require pre-determination of C2 A key advantage of the National Guard is the speed at which it can deploy forces. The National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF) provides every state with a ready combat arms force capable of delivering a unit of 50-75 personnel within 4-8 hours and a follow-on force of up to 400 personnel within 24-36 hours. 40 In 2005, when the Guard had over 75,000 Soldiers deployed overseas, they were still able to deploy over 30,000
Soldiers in support of Katrina in the first 72 hours; soon after the number grew to over 50,000 Soldiers and Airmen. 41 The National Guard is a community-based organization When exercising the dual-status option, the commander would report, through channels, to both the Governor and the President. Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, has pointed out that his biggest concern with this option is a commander caught in a conflict between a
Governor and the President. 51 While this is a valid concern, conflicts at the strategic level under the dual-status command option are fewer than conflicts at the operational level under the current parallel structure. Additionally, if it does occur, managing the risk of conflicting guidance at the strategic level is better than at the operational or tactical level (as is the case currently in a parallel command arrangement) and can be resolved by negotiation between the Governor and President while the response at the operational and tactical level continues. Because of this regular response as a state resource, the Guard must maintain interagency relationships. 53 These relationships then become extremely beneficial during a catastrophic incident. To establish these relationships and foster coordination and collaboration, the National Guard has to develop mechanisms to ensure that interagency relationships and operational constructs are in place. In the past, since there was no direct authority for NGB to coordinate Defense Support of Civil Authorities with other agencies, the primary means of coordination was through a liaison structure.
The National Guard currently has liaison officers (LNOs) working with multiple agencies, commands, and directorates within DoD and other federal agencies. The National Guard LNO facilitates the interaction between an agency and the National Guard at the federal level. In some cases, these liaison operations are structured and well served. In others, they are not. Functionally based and decentralized the current NGB homeland security liaison creates an environment in which the designated LNOs are not always fully aware of on-going projects and initiatives between NGB and DHS.
This decentralization also contributes to incomplete communications processes, leaving the LNO and NGB with an incomplete picture of requirements and opportunities for enhancing interagency collaboration. The NORTHCOM JIACG is unique in that NORTHCOM's mission is to support the civilian authorities, largely represented by the agencies on the JIACG. While the National Guard has a liaison structure for essentially the same purpose, it lacks the depth or coverage to benefit the broad new responsibilities faced by NGB and each state Guard. The National Guard could benefit from a structured, long-term mechanism, such as the JIACG, for interaction with other agencies associated with the homeland security enterprise. 56 The NGB JIACG would be the primary coordinating body for National Guard interagency planning at the national level. Its mission would be to synchronize integration of the National Guard efforts in interagency activities. The NGB JIACG would support operational planning and initiatives; conduct interagency capability assessments; and maintain interagency situational awareness. Additionally, during exercises and events, the JIACG would become an Interagency Coordination Center (ICC) to provide the interagency perspective to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the NGB Joint Staff. 57 To fully capitalize on the benefits of a NGB JIACG, there would need to be a mechanism for bridging interagency and military planning, coordination, and collaboration between the federal and state level. Accomplishing this at the regional level is better served than attempting to work through each of the fifty-four states and territories. The following recommendation suggests NGB should focus its interagency coordination efforts in alignment with FEMA's regional structure.
Recommendation #3. NGB and the National Guard should invest at the Regional Level by providing staff officers to support the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) of each FEMA region to assist in planning and coordination.
The Department of Defense and to a larger degree, the National Guard Bureau and the states' National Guards, should invest operationally at the regional level. NGB and the National Guard should invest at the Regional Level by providing staff officers to support the DCO of each FEMA region to assist in planning and coordination.
As noted in a 2006 study by the Homeland Security Policy Institute, "The operational response to a fast-moving disaster such as Katrina or 9/11 simply cannot be managed Formalizing relationships and responsibilities through permanent positions at the FEMA region headquarters rather than the current ad hoc or "surge" arrangements will encourage the use of federal regional and interstate assistance during routine incidents that do not rise to the level of catastrophic incidents. Additionally, it will help to embed the concept of regional and multi-jurisdictional response into day-to-day planning, coordination and collaboration and therefore make regional and multi-jurisdictional response during catastrophic incidents much less of a foreign concept. Pre-incident interaction will go a long way towards alleviating the problem of "first exchanging business cards during a disaster" or major incident/crisis. 66 
Conclusion
Today's complex, emerging threats and hazards demand a unified and coordinated national approach to domestic incident management. While there have been considerable improvements in preparedness, there is room for significant improvement in interagency planning, collaboration, coordination, and ultimately execution. The recommendations of this paper indicate less of a revolution than a continued evolution of policy, processes, procedures and organizational structure required to support civil authorities in times of crisis. First, by pre-determining the command and control structure for each of the fifteen planning scenarios for each FEMA region or state, the military can not only ensure unity of command during a catastrophic event, but it can also enhance preparedness by assigning responsibility up front. Secondly, establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group at the National Guard Bureau will ensure the timely and appropriate interagency collaboration and coordination through established relationships. Thirdly, by investing operationally at the regional level, the Department of Defense, the National Guard Bureau and the states' National Guards all stand to enhance their ability to respond when called upon.
Implementation of these recommendations will significantly enhance the effectiveness of the military response to catastrophic incidents within the United States and contribute to the overall security of our homeland. 
